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Building a Kenyan Monetary
Regime for the Twenty-first
Century
Christopher S. Adam, Benjamin O. Maturu, Njuguna S. Ndung'u,
and Stephen A. O'Connell

7.1 Introduction
This chapter asks: what sort of monetary framework is appropriate for Kenya
as it seeks to establish itself as a full-fledged emerging market economy in the
twenty-first century? Now is a particularly good time to consider the choices
facing the authorities, and the Central Bank in particular, as the transforma
tion of the macroeconomic landscape in Kenya, as elsewhere in Africa, has so
altered conditions that the redesign of the monetary framework is now both
pressing and meaningful. This transformation is not just in terms of economic
conditions, but also of perceptions of the scope and limits of monetary policy.
As recently as the early 1990s, the prevailing orthodoxy across much of Africa
was that monetary policy could and should be deployed as a purposive instmment in the broader development process. Thus, Honohan and O'Connell
(2008) describe post-Independence monetary frameworks in Africa as being
largely geared towards the (cheap) financing of government activities, the ex
tension of subsidized credit to favoured sectors, and active pursuit of an ex
change rate target (often reflecting the interests of powerful urban consumers
at the expense of producers), rather than the control of inflation.' Moreover,
weak fiscal control - informed to a degree by the same orthodoxy - meant that
monetary policy was conducted in an environment of substantial fiscal domi
nance, so that even basic macroeconomic policy coherence was achieved only
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by recourse to progressively tighter controls on the capital account and other
policies that repressed the development of domestic financial markets. This
cocktail of fiscal dominance and the overburdening of monetary policy with
multiple objectives led to the inevitable outcome that African monetary re
gimes neither delivered low inflation nor posted sustained gains on the other
policy objectives. This history is broadly consistent with the post-independ
ence monetary history of Kenya.
By the eariy 1990s, however, the evident failure of an (over)activist mon
etary policy encouraged moves to dismantle control regimes, liberalize foreign
exchange markets, and establish more robust fiscal regimes (often in the con
text of International Monetary Fund-supported stabilization programmes). As
a consequence, although a number of African countries still remain in the
grip of severe macroeconomic instability, most African central banks today
are under less pressure to accommodate large domestic fiscal deficits, while
the dismantling of systems of financial repression, the widespread elimina
tion of exchange controls, and a tendency towards the adoption of flexible
exchange rates has opened up the space for genuinely independent central
banks to function.
To frame our discussion, we start, in Section 7.2, by describing the charac
teristics of the monetary frameworks in floating exchange rate regimes such
as Kenya's, focusing specifically on monetary targeting and inflation target
ing. We pay particular attention to the latter, however, explicitly recognizing
the strengthening consensus view that formal inflation targeting (IT) offers a
coherent framework for the conduct of monetary policy, not only for industri
alized and established emerging market economies but also, with some modi
fication, for pre-emerging market economies such as Kenya (see O'Connell,
2010). This consensus view has, of course, been chailenged recently in some
quarters by those who see narrow IT frameworks as culpable in contribut
ing to the giobal financial crisis. Nonetheless, we concur with the dominant
view that the basic architecture of the formal inflation targeting framework
is sound and is iikeiy to remain in place in the future. Thus, this chapter
presumes a move in this direction by the monetary authorities in Kenya (and
eisewhere in the East African Community (EAC)): we therefore concentrate
on the challenges faced by the authorities as they seek to build an IT frame
work that is consistent with supporting sustained investment and growth in
the real economy. The key message from this chapter is that the authorities
should be focused on developing the institutional structures that will support
this anchor to domestic inflation.
Section 7.3 then provides a brief review of the conduct of monetary poiicy
since the mid-1990s, focusing principally on the quest to establish price stabiiity, while Section 7.4 returns to a set of practicai policy and design challenges
that, we feel, confronts Kenyan policy-makers as they seek to develop their
monetary poiicy framework. A number of the issues discussed in this chapter
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dovetail closely with those addressed in Chapter 8, which directly addresses
the design of monetary policy in the context of an increasingly open capital
account where concerns about nominal and real exchange rate volatility fig
ure large.

7.2 Choosing a monetary regime: some considerations^
A monetary regime defines the institutional framework to deliver monetary
poiicy and the constraints under which monetary policy-makers operate. To
day, most governments, and certainly most central bankers, would subscribe
to the view that the role of monetary policy can be reduced to three core func
tions. The first, overriding, function is the delivery of low and stable inflation.
Exactiy how low this should be is an unresolved question, especially in devel
oping countries, but crucially, whatever the target, the prevailing consensus
sees this function as being best pursued through some form of policy rule.
The case for rule-based policy is twofold. First, as argued by Milton Friedman,
policy rules (in his case, a constant growth rate for money) are desirable when
the authorities do not have the information or capability to know when or
how much to stimulate or dampen the economy. Without this capacity, activ
ist stabilization policies can end up exacerbating the very economic volatility
they seek to reduce. The second is that rules tie hands and heip to minimize
or eliminate the incentives of the monetary authorities to operate in a timeinconsistent manner.^
The second function, conditional on targeting inflation, is to moderate
fluctuations in the path of domestic output by judicious tightening or loosen
ing of the stance of monetary policy as circumstances dictate. This is funda
mentally a discretionary function and hence, to the extent that the output
stabilization objectives may run counter to inflation stabilization objectives
and vice versa, this potentially sets up a tension between rules and discretion
at the heart of monetary policy. It is this tension that a coherent monetary
framework must resolve. Contemporary monetary theory sees the reconcili
ation of these objectives emerging from a system of 'constrained discretion'
such as embodied in an inflation targeting framework, where the institutional
constraints defining the credible public commitment to an inflation target
create the space for the authorities to pursue output stabilization. The man
agement of this trade-off between inflation and output stabilization is particu
larly challenging in small open economies subject to large supply-side shocks,
such as Kenya. We consider this issue in some detail in Section 7.4.
The final function of monetary policy is less direct. It is to support the
smooth functioning of the payments system and the financial system more
generally, so as to promote the efficient market-based allocation of credit and
pricing of risk in support of efficient investment and growth. As above, this
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objective may not necessarily be consistent with price and output stabiliza
tion and, again, a coherent monetary framework must reconcile and prioritize
these competing objectives. We say little about this function in this chapter;
later chapters focus specifically on issues of capital market development.
7.2.1 Money targeting versus inflation targeting in emerging markets

Virtually all contemporary monetary regimes can be thought of as 'inflation
targeting' in the strict sense that a central - if not the dominant - objective of
monetary policy is to establish a credible anchor for domestic prices. Frame
works differ in terms of how they operationalize this objective; in other words,
how they choose the nominal anchor.^ This choice is not unconstrained, how
ever; rather, it has implications for how the authorities address the other con
cerns competing for their attention. This tension is encapsulated in the notion
of the 'impossible trinity' or 'trilemma', which states that, beyond the short
run, no country can simultaneously maintain an open capital account, target
the exchange rate, and pursue an independent monetary policy. One of the
three must be abandoned even though each is desirable in its own right: open
capital accounts to the extent that they support the efficient global allocation
of capital to high-return investment opportunities; exchange rate targeting to
support trade and sustain a stable external value of the currency; and an inde
pendent monetary policy to pursue domestic output stabilization objectives.^
Although debate continues on the case for limiting short-run cross-bor
der capital flows through either tax or other restrictions, and even though
this debate has, if anything, become more strident in the wake of the global
financial crisis, it is reasonable to expect that capital flows have become per
manently more responsive to cross-border return differentials (see Chapter 8
for evidence). Hence, for most countries, including those in East Africa, the
resolution of the trilemma has become a simple choice over the nominal an
chor: does it make better sense in terms of the other objectives of monetary
policy to fix the exchange rate to a reference currency and adopt that coun
try's anchor (and thus its monetary policy) or to let the exchange rate float
and use domestic policy instruments to anchor inflation? At least since the
early 1990s, Kenya has chosen the latter path and has used the growth of
broad money as the anchor.
MONEY TARGETING

The rationale for money targeting as an anchoring mechanism builds on
two assumptions, both of which are verifiable. The first is that the manner in
which the private sector manages its wealth portfolio, of which the demand
for money is one crucial element, induces a predictable relationship between
money and prices. If this relationship is stable, then a policy that targets the

143

Adam et al.

growth of nominal money has some prospect of stabilizing inflation at desired
levels and at reasonable cost in terms of other objectives. Specifically, starting
with the definition of the velocity of circulation v=Py/M where P is the price
level, y a measure of real economic activity, and M broad money, then if the
change in velocity and the level of real economic activity can be predicted,
these can be used to generate an inflation-consistent path for broad money
growth. Using a hat (^) to denote the growth rate of a variable, n the rate of
inflation, the superscript p for projection, and a star (*) for a target, we obtain
the following relationship relating the intermediate target (M) to the ultimate
objective (inflation), given projections about the demand for real balances
(the term in parenthesis):
M* = 7T*+(y^-?0

(7.1)

The second assumption is that there is a stable and exploitable relation
ship between the intermediate target, money, and the central bank's policy
instrument, which, in the case of Kenya and most other African economies,
is currently base (or reserve) money, denoted here as H, which consists of the
currency in circulation in the economy plus the reserves of the banking sys
tems lodged with the central bank. This relationship, the money multiplier,
is defined as m=M/H. Using this expression, we can rewrite Equation (7.1) as
a simple control rule linking base money growth to the target inflation rate
conditional on the evolution of the real demand for base money (as proxied
by the growth in output and velocity) and the money multiplier:
= TT* + (y -v’’ -m’’)

(7-2)

Assuming the stability, or at least predictability, of m ensures that a given
intermediate target for M (from Equation (7.1)) implies a path for H and a cor
responding constraint on the evolution of the central bank's balance sheet.
Placing H on this path is the central bank's task. The asset-side counterparts
to base money on the bank's balance sheet are net international reserves
(NIR) and net domestic assets (NDA), principal among which are central bank
claims on government.® Conventionally, and certainly under IMF-supported
programmes, the path for NIR is bounded below by the need to maintain suf
ficient foreign exchange liquidity to meet unanticipated shocks to the balance
of payments. When this constraint binds, overall control of the growth in
reserve money devolves to setting a ceiling on the growth of NDA, which in
turn is dominated by central bank lending to government. Monetary target
ing, in this sense, is therefore a programme built around quantitative money
supply targets that constrains fiscal choices (it also limits the extent to which
foreign reserve accumulation, which may be undertaken to meet an exchange
rate objective, can proceed unsterilized because, at the margin, any growth in
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NIR needs to be offset or sterilized by a corresponding reduction in NDA to
satisfy a given target for reserve money).
INFLATION TARGETING

Inflation targeting pursues the same fundamental objective, but here the
nominal anchor is expected inflation. The instruments at the disposal of the
central bank (be they interest rates or quantitative instruments) are set not
to influence a tangible quantity or price but rather to directly influence the
private sector's expected or forecasted rate of inflation at some horizon. The
rationale is that future expected inflation feeds into current price- and wage
setting behaviour; a credible inflation target thus leads to target-consistent
price and wage-setting behaviour today, thereby validating the forecast.
The essence of IT is that the authorities' policy actions and announcements
credibly influence the evolution of the private sector's inflation expectations.
Three elements therefore define contemporary IT regimes. The first is an ex
plicit public commitment to a target inflation rate, defined in terms of either
overall 'headline' inflation or 'core' inflation, where the latter excludes spe
cific items such as food and fuel of which prices are determined principally by
supply-side effects or world market conditions (we return to this issue below).
This public commitment to the target establishes as the focal point for public
scrutiny the inflation rate itself, rather than an intermediate indicator such as
money, the measurement of which is difficult and the intrinsic relevance of
which may be obscure.
Second, the policy instrument (typically the policy interest rate) is set to
guide the economy towards this target on the basis of a forward-looking reac
tion function of the form:
i,^r +

- tt*] +

-

yj

(7.3)

Equation (7.3) is known as a Taylor rule after John Taylor (Taylor, 1993)
who observed that federal policy after 1980 was well approximated by a re
action function of this form. Here, r is the long-run equilibrium (or neutral)
real interest rate, assumed to be constant and defined as the rate that would
equate aggregate demand with aggregate supply if wages and prices were flex
ible, and En^^. is expected inflation i periods in the future.^ Policy responds
both to deviations in the inflation forecast from the target and to deviations
in output from its potential (i.e. to the output gap). There is no requirement
that the feedback parameters Yj and are equal. Rather, the parameter values
reflect the nature of the transmission mechanism and the relative weights
given to inflation and the output gap in the monetary authority's preferences.
However, achieving the inflation objective does require a positive coefficient
on the inflation deviation term in Equation (7.3). This is the so-called 'Taylor
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principle', which says that, holding the output gap constant, the monetary
authorities must respond to an increase in observed inflation by increasing
the expected short-term Teal interest rate
(see Woodford, 2003).
A key distinction between money targeting and inflation targeting ap
proaches is that there appears to be no role for money in the latter. However,
even though the Taylor rule is written in terms of a policy interest rate, it could
equally have been derived in terms of reserve money (by using an expression
for the demand for money to substitute reserve money for the interest rate).
In other words, the same ultimate policy reaction could be accomplished ei
ther directly, by controlling the interest rate, or indirectiy, by controlling the
supply of central bank balances. As other countries, such as Mexico, have
shown, a fully consistent IT framework can be implemented with the quantity
of reserve money serving as the policy instrument. Indeed, unavailability of
a policy interest rate does not rule out the setting of available policy instru
ments to target expected inflation to whatever degree desired.
The third element is a structured approach to deliberation and communi
cation on the part of the central bank. In part, this requires that the relevant
inflation index is publicly understood and that the public has confidence in its
measurement. But more generally, the objective is to make public, in a timely
fashion, the central bank's own information and analysis to ensure that its
actions are verifiable and its own expectations of future developments are re
vealed, thereby resolving the problems of asymmetric information, which can
create incentives for time-inconsistent behaviour on the part of the monetary
authorities.
In practice, this has seen IT central banks publish the evidence and analy
sis that informs their rate-setting decisions; publish the voting records of the
members of interest rate-setting committees; and devote substantial resourc
es to public information and direct engagement with key stakeholders. This
comprehensive communication strategy applies both when inflation is on
target and, a fortiori, when it is off target, in which case additional disclosure
requirements may be placed on the central bank to explain deviations and
specify remedial action to return inflation to target.** Important in establishing
the credibility of this structure is the reliance on independent external mem
bership of key decision-making bodies and the pressures these bodies exert on
the national statistics offices to produce timely and accurate data.’
When successful, these characteristics - the explicit inflation target, the
'Taylor principle', and the associated public disclosure and explanation of pol
icy decisions and outcomes - deliver the credibility required to defuse the time
inconsistency probiem inherent in monetary policy by validating the belief in
the private sector's mind that the central bank will (eventually) bring inflation
back on track and will do so in a transparent manner. Moreover, theory sug
gests, as inflation expectations firm around the target, the pass-through from
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current price developments to expected future inflation reduces, allowing the
authorities to use monetary instruments to pursue other ultimate targets of
policy, which may include competitiveness or stabilization of short-run out
put around its potential.
This textbook description of a full-fledged IT regime sets the bar high and,
in practice, only a few countries demonstrate all these characteristics. Stone
(2003) has coined the term 'inflation targeting lite' (ITL) to describe countries
- and Kenya would count among these - whose frameworks are gravitating to
wards an IT configuration but where, operationally, the conduct of monetary
policy may still lack clarity of objectives and transparency of communication.
In such regimes, the authorities often announce a target for inflation and
publically commit to a flexible exchange rate but, in practice, they tend to ac
tively manage the exchange rate, often to the point where the prioritization of
the competing constraints of an independent monetary policy and the desire
to influence the path of the exchange rate is obscure.^® Moreover, structures
for communication and verification are only beginning to be established; do
mestic asset markets remain relatively thin and central bank balance sheets
are often still too weak to allow effective deployment of interest-rate-based
policy instmments; and, in some cases, core analytical capacity - in inflation
forecasting and developing robust models of the transmission mechanism, for
example - are only just being built.
7.2.2 Summary and the challenges of translating IT for low-income
countries

The spread of inflation targeting after 1990 was influenced in large measure
by the successful performance of adopters (see Mishkin and Schmidt-Hebbel,
2007). No inflation targeting country has yet abandoned this approach to
conducting monetary policy, whereas more and more countries, in addition
to those already classified as pursuing ITL regimes, are moving closer to em
bracing IT frameworks. This remains the case even after the approach came
under heavy criticism from some quarters for being responsible, in part, for
the global financial crisis that erupted in 2008. Critics argued that the nar
row mandate and relatively short horizon over which targets were defined
led policy-makers to pay insufficient attention to asset price inflation, and
contributed to excessively lax monetary and credit conditions and the build
up of financial imbalances that preceded the crisis. From this followed calls for
reform, ranging from the operational, for example, that central banks should
seek to 'lean against the wind' of asset price movements, to the radical rede
sign of the framework of monetary policy, including even calls to abandon IT
regimes in favour of more discretionary regimes (there have been no sustained
calls, however, for a return to monetary targeting).^'
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Although aspects of the critique have grabbed headlines, the case against
inflation targeting has not attracted widespread support in academia or from
central banks themselves. On the contrary, the prevailing view - certainly
among industrialized countries and mature emerging market economies - is
that the essential framework of IT remains a robust and pragmatic solution to
the problem of assigning responsibility for inflation control and - subject to
that - for the stabilization of output around the natural rate. Central banks
remain the appropriate institution and interest rates the appropriate instru
ment. In the context of the crisis, however, the key point is that inflation con
trol and output stabilization were only part of the assignment problem and,
although operational errors were probably made in the conduct of monetary
policy at this time, the crisis owed much more to failures elsewhere, specifical
ly in the areas of financial sector regulation and fiscal policy. As the Governor
of the Bank of England, Mervyn King, has noted: '.. .inflation targeting is a
necessary but not sufficient condition for stability in the economy as a whole.
When a policy is necessary but not sufficient, the answer is not to abandon,
but to augment it' (King, 2009).
This confidence is probably well grounded. But we must also recognize that
IT is the outcome of industrialized countries' generally unsuccessful attempts
to address their own specific stabilization problems in the late 1970s and
1980s, following the collapse of the Bretton Woods exchange rate arrange
ments. The intellectual underpinning and, indeed, the implementation of IT
regimes thus reflect a set of economic structures and institutions very different
from those in developing countries and especially low-income countries.
Making a robust case for adopting IT in Kenya, and for other low-income
countries, therefore obliges us to address a number of key issues. O'Connell
(2010) outlines some of these challenges:
Does it make sense to target inflation when exchange rates, food prices,
and public-sector prices (utilities, fuel, and public sector wages) are more
prominent - and verifiable - in the public eye? Can the framework be de
ployed successfully when supply shocks are dominant and the GDP gap is
difficult to measure? Is there a role for exchange rate targets, given imper
fect capital mobility and the importance of export promotion? What op
erational policy rules can be used when there is not a strong transmission
from policy interest rates to aggregate demand, and where (as in almost
all African cases) central banks use balance sheet instruments rather than
interest rates?
We take up some of the challenges in Section 7.4, but before doing so, we
provide some context by offering a brief description of monetary conditions
and developments in Kenya over the last decade.
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7.3 Monetary policy in Kenya: recent performance and
institutional change
7.3.1 Macroeconomic stabilization

The early 1990s represented a watershed for the Kenyan economy. The impe
tus towards economic liberalism, first laid out in the famous Sessional Paper
No. 1 of 1986, which saw Kenya turn its back on its post-independence diri
gisme, gained momentum as a sequence of events forced the pace of reforms.
A standoff with the IMF in 1992 and the general hardening of donor attitudes
towards corruption - responding in particular to the recently exposed Goldenberg scandal - saw the external budget constraint tighten substantially and
prompted government to move rapidly to establish fiscal control and allow the
exchange rate to float relatively freely. By the mid-1990s, de jure capital con
trols had been substantially eliminated (Bandiera et ah, 2008). These changes
in the policy regime laid the foundations for a decade of solid if not spectacu
lar performance lasting until the end of 2007. Output growth increased from
around 2 per cent per annum in the late 1990s to around 4 per cent in the first
half of the 2000s and to close to 7 per cent per annum in 2007. Underpinning
this was a monetary framework that was successful in taking advantage of the
'great moderation' in the global economy to bring domestic inflation back
under control. This regime - which remains substantially in place today - was
configured rather conventionally around a broad money anchor, with reserve
money functioning as the operational target.
With this framework in place, and with government maintaining a rela
tively tight fiscal stance, inflation fell sharply from its peak of around 60 per
cent per annum in early 1994 and remained in single digits throughout the
remainder of the decade (see Figure 7.1). By the mid-2000s, however, inflation
was once more starting to drift upwards and accelerated from 2007. Most of
this latter increase is accounted for by the accommodation of sharply rising
food and fuel prices, which, in turn, reflected developments in global com
modity markets combined with a severe drought at home. Given the weight
of food and fuel in the overall consumer prices index (CPI), these develop
ments drove headline inflation higher. Recent work by the IMF and the Ken
yan National Bureau of Statistics suggests that some of this sharp rise in food
and overall inflation from the mid-2000s may have been spurious, stemming
from methodological errors in the calculation of price indices. A new infla
tion series was introduced in November 2009, at which point year-on-year
headline inflation was revised downwards from 17.5 per cent per annum to
6.5 per cent.'^
Nonetheless, inflation - including core inflation, which was less affected
by external cost-push factors - had started drifting upwards before 2007, and
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Figure 7.1 Year-on-year inflation, 1990-2009.

concerns were being expressed that, compared with the immediate post-1994
period, the monetary targeting framework was becoming less effective, even
after allowing for the effect of measurement bias in the inflation data.
At a technical level, concerns also focused on the efficacy of the money
targeting approach and, in particular, the increasing difficulty in accurately
predicting the velocity of circulation and the money multiplier. The conse
quences of these prediction errors can be seen if we use the reserve money
growth identity (Equation (7.2) above) to decompose, ex post, the inflation
error. Recalling that a p superscript denotes a prediction and a star (*) a target,
the deviation of inflation from its target can be defined as:
(7T - 7T*)

= (H - H*)- (y+

+

(7.4)

Overshooting the inflation target can thus be attributed to (some combina
tion) of four factors: (i) excess growth in reserve money, possibly reflecting a
loss of fiscal control or unsterilized exchange rate targeting; (ii) lower than
predicted output growth; (iii) higher than predicted velocity (i.e. a lower than
predicted demand for money given the path of real income); and (iv) a higher
than predicted money multiplier. The converse also holds so that, for exam
ple, overprediction of the velocity of circulation (in other words, money de
mand pessimism) will lead to an overtightening of monetary conditions and
an undershoot of the inflation target.
We can use Equations (7.2) and (7.4) to evaluate the performance of the
reserve money programme in Kenya over the last decade. Figure 7.2 compares
the actual growth in reserve money against a counterfactual 'inflation-consist
ent' path. The latter is computed from Equation (7.2) on the basis of a target
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------- Inflation-consistent RM growth

-------Actual RM growth

Figure 7.2 Actual versus inflation-consistent growth in reserve money (RM).

inflation rate of 5 per cent per annum, and assumes that year-on-year real out
put growth is projected without error. The projected growth rates for velocity
and the multiplier are computed at each point in time by extrapolating the
growth rate over the past three years.
A number of features emerge from Figure 7.2. The first is that the average
'excess' money growth, although positive, is relatively low, with the mean de
viation at just less than 1 percentage point per quarter, against a mean growth
in reserve money of approximately 7 per cent per quarter. Second, however,
the standard deviation around this mean is large (8 per cent per quarter).
Deviations (in growth rates) from the target are, however, short-lived, their
half-life of around four months suggesting a relatively strong 'error correction'
element to the authorities' policy reaction function. This is consistent with
recent econometric work by Maturu (2007) and Rotich et al. (2008) show
ing that deviations in actual reserve money from its inflation-consistent path
have a significant feedback effect on overall inflation, and that over this pe
riod, the Central Bank of Kenya (CBK) responded aggressively to such devia
tions in accordance with the 'Taylor principle'. An important implication of
these papers is that, over the 2007-09 period when the 'inflation bias' in the
CPI was increasing sharply, the progressively tighter monetary stance shown
in Figure 7.3 was, ex post, tighter than required, arguably pulling the economy
towards its inflation target more rapidly and at a higher cost in terms of other
objectives than was desirable.
Building on Figure 7.2, Table 7.1 decomposes the inflation error in Equa
tion (7.4) in terms of the different components of the money targeting
programme.
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Figure 7.3 Velocity of circulation and M3 money multiplier.

Prediction errors in both velocity and the multiplier account for between
0.7 and 1.2 percentage points of the inflation error, but this is relatively small
compared with the 'residual' component, which consists of the contribution
of overpredicting the growth in real GDP plus the effect the prediction errors
have for the inflation-consistent growth of reserve money. The single largest
factor in play is the difficulty in predicting real output growth. As our later
Table 7.1 Decomposition of excess inflation 2000ql to 2008q4

Inflation error: (tt — tt* )

2000ql-2008q4

2000ql-2004q4

2005ql-2008q4

6.3

3.1

10.4

0.7

-0.8

2.6

0.3

0.2

0.5

0.4
-4.9

0.4
-3.3

0.7
-6.6

-4.1

-2.7

-5.4

Represented by:
Excess money growth (H — H')
(relative to ex ante inflationconsistent path - Eigure 7.2)
Plus:
Prediction error in:
Velocity (v —v'’)
Money multiplier (m — m’’)
Residual
o/w prediction error in real GDP
growth

Errors in percentage points of inflation. See text for calculation of predicted velocity and money
multiplier values; 'excess money growth' is defined relative to ex ante inflation-consistent path,
which assumes zero prediction errors in velocity, money multiplier, and real GDP. The residual Is
therefore the net effect of the deviation between the ex ante and ex post inflation-consistent growth
in reserve money, the principal component of which is the prediction error in the growth of real
GDP, (y-V).
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discussion emphasizes, forecasting output accurately (and determining the
nature of output shocks) is, and will continue to be, a first-order challenge for
any economy, such as Kenya, undergoing rapid structural transformation. As
Table 7.1 suggests, the returns to improved forecasting of output are likely to
be high: this should be a priority research activity of the central bank.
Although forecast errors in velocity and the money multiplier are somewhat
smaller, their importance should not be understated. Since 2002, velocity has
been steadily declining, although with marked quarter-on-quarter variation.
This falling trend in velocity - which increases the inflation-consistent growth
of broad money - has been accompanied by a sharp trend increase in the
money multiplier, which, for a given target growth rate of broad money,
reduces the inflation-consistent growth rate of reserve money. More signifi
cantly, however, both have been relatively volatile, which makes prediction
difficult. Under strict financial programming - meaning that the short-run
path for reserve money is aggressively error-corrected to keep inflation on
target - mistakes in forecasting velocity and the multiplier (and, indeed, errors
in forecasting real output) are transmitted to the real economy via swings in
the liquidity conditions facing banks, causing them to maintain a more liquid
asset book, which adversely affects the cost and quantity of their long-term
lending.
Setting aside the chailenges in controlling reserve money itself, predicting
velocity and the multiplier is increasingly difficult. In Kenya, as elsewhere
in Africa, there has been a systematic tendency towards underprediction of
money demand growth during periods of favourable structural reforms, which
have tended both to increase the 'monetary intensity' of economic activity
(thereby exogenously raising money demand) and to support a step-decline
in inflation expectations.*^ Failure to recognize this means excessive monetary
restraint and excessively high domestic interest rates. In addition, as Berg and
Borensztein (2000) and Buffie et ah (2008) have argued, currency substitu
tion and dollarization will tend to increase the instability of money demand,
thereby exacerbating the risk of unpredictable shifts in velocity.
The money multiplier is equally difficult to predict with accuracy in times
of rapid financial innovation (see, for example, Saxegaard, 2006). First, aside
from increasing the instability of money demand, dollarization may have sim
ilar effects on the money multiplier if the intermediate target is defined solely
in terms of domestic monetary liabilities. In Kenya, the monetary target, M3,
includes foreign currency deposits, which internalizes such portfolio shifts
(although the stability of the multiplier is now influenced in part by the effect
of exchange rate revaluation operating on foreign currency deposits).
Second, however, rapid financial innovation is transforming financial mar
kets, both in the large-scale formal end and, perhaps most dramatically, with
the rapid expansion of M-Pesa mobile phone banking, which is beginning to
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have important consequences for the nature of money demand in Kenya (see
Chapter 13 and Jack et al., 2010). Figure 7.4 plots the currency-to-deposit ratio
over the period from 2000 to 2008, where the vertical line marks the introduc
tion of M-Pesa. This ratio - which is one of the key components in the money
multiplier - shows a marked decline in the cash-to-deposit ratio as M-Pesa
has been rolled out. Such innovation may also be expected to feed back onto
banks' own behaviour, altering their own liquidity preference, which, in turn,
will be reflected in movements in the bank reserve ratio.*^
Finally, maintaining a focus on money growth rather than on inflation it
self may lead to a bias in favour of excess tightness even when inflation is cor
rectly predicted to fall, for example because money demand is rising. This can
arise because of a fear that warranted rapid nominal money growth cannot
be explained to the public without undermining confidence about inflation,
or perhaps, and more correctly, it will not be understood properly, precisely
because the public would like to focus on indicators that bear directly on their
lives, such as exchange rate movements, interest rates, and food prices.
Although problems of accurate measurement of inflation and output (and
the output gap) are also present under inflation targeting, the direct focus on
the ultiinate target of inflation, rather than on an intermediate target such
as money, means the difficulties presented by shifts in velocity and the mul
tiplier are obviated. Inflation targeting bypasses movements in intermediate
aggregates, and hence accommodates structural shifts in and shocks to money
demand, either through discretionary adjustment of quantitative policy in
struments (reserve money) or automatically once interest rates emerge as the
main policy instrument. A virtuous circle may emerge as the greater the sta
bilizing effect of policy on inflation expectations, the more stable becomes
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the demand for money itself and the lower the expected volatility from this
source.
7.3.2 Institutional reforms: same framework, evolving institutional
architecture
These challenges in conducting monetary policy have taken place against the
background of important and far-reaching institutional and structural chang
es to the monetary framework, through which the Central Bank of Kenya has
gained greater operational independence. Allied to continued fiscal control
and the progressive deepening of domestic money and capital markets, this
has endowed Kenya with an institutional structure conducive to building a
coherent inflation targeting monetary framework. Successive revisions to the
Central Bank of Kenya Act have served to define the objectives of monetary
policy, help develop price-based instruments of monetary policy, and support
a consistent strategy for communication and engagement.'*
The 1996 revision to the Act gave the Central Bank a clear mandate to
'formulate and implement monetary policy directed at achieving and main
taining stability in the general level of prices' while fostering 'the liquidity,
solvency and proper functioning of a stable market-based financial system'.
This mandate was made concrete in the form of an inflation target announced
by the Minister of Finance in the annual Finance Bill. This target has remained
at 5 per cent per annum since the first Monetary Policy Statement issued in
2007. This unambiguous mandate was, however, modified in 2007 with the
introduction of a less precise requirement that, conditional on the Bank meeting
its core requirements, the Bank should seek to 'support the economic policy of
the Government, including its objectives for growth and employment'.
But perhaps the landmark change was the introduction in the 2007 revi
sions of an executive committee on monetary policy - the Monetary Policy
Committee (MPC). The MPC formulates monetary policy and is accountable
to the Board of the CBK. In addition to its advisory and policy formulation
functions, the MPC, which consists of both internal and external members,
plays a central role in the communication of policy decisions and their ration
ale, thereby serving to co-ordinate market expectations and communicate the
likely future path of the economy.

7.4 Challenges
In terms of structure and conduct, the Kenyan monetary regime is, at present,
a hybrid. The authorities publish an explicit inflation target, but concerns
about the level and volatility of the exchange rate remain ever present, and
the debate on the extent to which monetary policy can and should be used
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to address concerns about external competitiveness is active (see Chapter
8). The language of monetary policy emphasizes the role of indirect instmments in influencing the price of credit, but practice is resolutely anchored
in a conventional quantity-based approach, where M3 remains the principal
intermediate target and the volume of reserve money the operating instmment. Thus, although, for the moment, the Kenyan authorities have stopped
short of implementing a full-fledged formal inflation targeting structure, there
are pressures to move decisively in this direction. These pressures have been
both technical and political. At a technical level, as noted above, concerns
have been mounting that, although the current money-based programme per
formed exceptionally well in establishing price stability in the decade from
the mid-1990s, it has been performing less well as the economy develops and
financial markets deepen and become more open. These new sources of insta
bility alter the transmission mechanism and challenge the basis for a simple
money-based programme. Meanwhile, monetary policy continues to contend
with both substantial supply-side shocks to agriculture, the terms of trade and
aid, and periodic portfolio shocks, with the most recent being the shift away
from the Kenyan shilling at the time of the election-related violence in early
2008. Not all of these challenges relate solely to the use of money targeting
however. We have already alluded to the problems of forecasting output, and
the errors in the official measurement of inflation, which recently placed the
programme under strain, would have led to a 'deflation bias' in any monetary
framework where the ultimate policy objective is an inflation target.
On the political side, there is pressure towards increased economic integra
tion under the auspices of the EAC. Some of this is in the domain of trade
policy, but it is being accompanied by moves towards monetary union (echo
ing the African Union (AU)'s Abuja Declaration on economic integration of
2005). In August 2007, the heads of state of the EAC (Kenya, Uganda, Tan
zania, Rwanda, and Burundi)'^ committed themselves to full monetary un
ion in 2012. Although significant doubts surround the feasibility of meeting
this target date - a view reinforced by the recently endorsed ECB report - the
central banks of the EAC, including the CBK, have committed themselves to
move, with deliberate speed, towards revising the current framework to ac
commodate changing policy challenges and emerging wisdom in inflation
targeting (including, as an important first step, harmonization of methods for
measuring inflation).
Other than South Africa, the only African economy that has sought to im
plement full-fledged inflation targeting is Ghana, which embarked on this
path in May 2007. Implementation has been difficult (Sowa and Abradu-Otoo,
2009) and, as O'Connell (2010) notes:
...the Bank of Ghana had yet to achieve a target range that was already
higher and wider than that of any other targeter. Its struggles with trans-
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parenq? are palpable and it remains to be seen whether the distortions
implied by committing to a target that is rarely met, of unclear salience,
and difficult to forecast, are fundamentally damaging to economic stabil
ity - or are more than compensated by committing the fiscal authorities to
self-restraint and forcing the pace of institutional maturation within the
central bank.
These same concerns must, of course, figure large if Kenya were to move in
the same direction. In this final section, we consider some of these in more
detail. We focus on four issues: (i) the efficacy of IT regimes in environments
subject to supply-side shocks; (ii) reconciling IT with competing policy objec
tives, specifically those concerning the exchange rate and competitiveness;
(iii) the challenge of a weak monetary transmission mechanism; and finally
(iv) whether an IT regime can form a buttress against future fiscal indisci
pline. The importance of investing in the research capacity of the CBK and
its MFC and the data generation capacity of the statistical authorities is an
obvious fifth chalienge. We do not treat this separately here, not least because
our discussion of the other challenges effectively defines the relevant research
agenda.
7.4.1 Inflation targeting when supply-side shocks predominate
All economies are exposed to both aggregate demand and aggregate supply
shocks. For demand-side shocks - for example, unanticipated public expendi
ture - the impact on the output gap on the one hand and inflation on the
other is positively correlated (excess demand drives up both the output gap
and inflation), whereas this correlation is negative for supply-side shocks.
As Figure 7.5 shows, as per capita incomes rise, the correlation of output
and inflation flips from negative to positive. This is consistent with the inter
pretation that, in an industrialized country environment shocks tend to come
predominantly from the demand side, whereas in developing and emerging
market countries, supply-side shocks tend to play a much larger role. An obvi
ous, indeed perennial, example of the latter would be the effect of unantici
pated variations in rainfall on agricultural output. Kenya's location in Figure
7.5 is consistent with the prevalence of this type of shock. It turns out that
this simple distinction poses a major challenge for the conduct of monetary
policy, as it undermines one of the features that have made inflation target
ing so attractive to industrialized economies. Moreover, pursuit of aggressive
inflation targeting in the presence of supply-side shocks may, in fact, be coun
terproductive by leveraging up this output volatility. And to make matters
worse, the obvious solution to the problem - the one adopted in other settings
- turns out to be quite unattractive for low-income countries such as Kenya.
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Figure 7.5 Demand-side versus supply-side shocks.

The figure plots the correlation between output and inflation 'shocks' against per capita income for
118 countries for which continuous data exist over the period 1990-2008. Shocks are measured as
the deviation of actual inflation (output) from a Hodrick-Prescott trend.

The essential problem is as follows; with demand shocks moving output
and inflation in the same direction, a policy reaction, for example an interest
rate rise, designed to bring inflation back on track will simultaneously serve
to eliminate excess demand. This 'divine coincidence' - the fact that demand
shocks dominate and that a policy reaction targeting inflation also targets
output - goes a long way to explaining the attraction of IT in industrialized
countries. With supply-side shocks - for example an increase in the cost of
imported oil, which drives up production costs, thereby reducing output, and
simultaneously adds to inflationary pressures - output and inflation will move
in opposite directions. One instrument is now no longer sufficient: acting to
stabilize the inflationary consequences of a supply shock risks exacerbating
the adverse output effects and vice versa. This brings to the fore the essential
problem of monetary policy: with a single instrument, policy-makers must
confront the trade-off between competing objectives (in this case inflation
and output stabilization).
This is, of course, a generic 'instruments and objectives' problem, and will
occur under any choice of anchor but, as Frankel et al. (2007) show, the ap
peal of IT over other policy rules - most notably a money targeting rule - as a
means of delivering lower inflation volatility and lower output volatility only
holds true when demand shocks dominate. When supply shocks dominate,
strict IT continues to deliver lower inflation volatility but at the cost of higher
output volatility.'® In these circumstances, a conventional money-based an
chor will result in lower output volatility (although inflation volatility will be
higher), and the unambiguous welfare-based argument in favour of IT disap
pears. Frankel et al. (2007) present these results in the context of very simple
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policy rules in which IT is strict (such that no weight is placed on output
stabilization) and where money targeting is concerned exclusively with the
intermediate target (money) and not with either inflation or output itself.
Nonetheless, the fundamental point remains under more general policy rules
such as the Taylor rule specified in Equation (7.3) above.
It is certainly not the case that the tension thrown up by supply-side shocks
is restricted to developing countries only. It is just much more pervasive. In
dustrialized country central banks did, however, face exactly this trade-off in
the first half of 2008 when the sharp increase in fuel and ofher input costs
began to simultaneously squeeze output and stoke inflationary pressures. (Ad
mittedly, this episode was short-lived as the global financial crisis and the mas
sive deleveraging that occurred subsequently turned this incipient supply-side
shock into a negative demand shock of much greater proportions, in which
central banks were confronted by falling output and the threat of deflation:
in this case, there was no trade-off and the conventional 'Taylor rule macro'
response by central banks was rapid and decisive, and was only limited by the
fact that the policy instrument, the interest rate, hit its zero lower bound.)
But it is important to reflect on what these countries did in 2008 in order
to understand the implications it has for the implementation of IT in coun
tries such as Kenya where supply-side shocks are comparatively common. The
conventional argument for handling supply shocks - which was employed
in indusfrialized economies in 2008 - recognizes that such shocks typically
emanate from developments in markets in which prices are outside the direct
control of the domestic authorities. In most small open economies, these are
the markets for food and fuel, where prices of the former are driven to a large
extent by weather conditions*’ and of the latter by world market conditions.
The appropriate response of (IT) policy-makers, therefore, is to distinguish
between 'core' components of inflation - those where domestic policy has lev
erage - and these 'non-core' components of inflation and to bring to bear the
apparatus of IT only on the core component of inflation, reacting to move
ments in non-core prices only to the extent that they have second-round feed
back effects on core inflation.^® This leads to a strategy of accommodating the
first-round effects of non-core price movements but bearing down on any
second-round effects. This is why most industrialized country inflation targeters allowed their headline inflation rates to stray outside its target zone in
the first half of 2008.
This approach makes sense in developed counfries where non-core compo
nents account for a relatively small share of the overall CPI, so that focusing
monetary policy on the stabilization of core inflation goes a long way towards
stabilizing overall inflation without drawing the authorities into destabilizing
responses to supply-side shocks.^* In Kenya, as in other low-income countries,
however, non-core items account for a large share of the CPI. As noted in Fig
ure 7.1, the combined food and fuel share in Kenya's CPI basket has been in
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excess of 60 per cent, and even following the revisions to the CPI weights in
March 2010, the food share in the CPI is still around 40 per cent and fuel a fur
ther 18 per cent. In other words, targeting core inflation would mean that the
authorities will end up targeting less than half the overall consumption bas
ket. Even if an IT regime was extremely successful in stabilizing core inflation,
this may still co-exist with high volatility in headline inflation if the evolution
of prices of non-core items is volatile. If, as seems reasonable, we believe that
private agents set prices and wages not in terms of the evolution of expected
core inflation - as IT theory suggests - but on actual headline inflation, the
efficacy of monetary policy is likely to be undermined as inflation expecta
tions will be less securely anchored by any given policy action. Stated slightly
differently, trying to control overall inflation in these environments would
require the authorities to lean much more heavily on their policy levers, with
the attendant risk of greater volatility in output and interest rates.
These are uncomfortable but unavoidable truths. As we have noted above,
there are good arguments for believing that targeting inflation directly may be
preferable to targeting money, at least from the perspective of anchoring inflation.
But we may also need to recognize that this may come at the cost of higher
output volatility, and that this volatility may be greater the broader the meas
ure of inflation we seek to stabilize. Having said this, it is reasonable to expect
that, over time, the process of economic growth and structural transformation
wil/ease the severity of this trade-off, both as the share of non-core goods in
total consumption declines and as diversification and innovation reduce the
likely scale and frequency of supply-side shocks.
7.4.2 Reconciling exchange rate objectives
As stressed in the introduction, the incoherence brought about by the over
burdening of monetary policy with multiple objectives meant that monetary
regimes often delivered on none of them. But, even though a new understand
ing of the limits of monetary policy has emerged, the multiple objectives have
not entirely disappeared, with concerns about the path and volatility of the
exchange rate still playing a dominant role. This is certainly true for Kenya, as
shown clearly in Chapter 8.
One strand of the IT literature (for example Batini and Laxton, 2007) argues
for a clear and unambiguous prioritization of the inflation target with the
authorities forgoing any attempt to manage the exchange rate. This argument
does not imply that they should ignore the exchange rate - not least because
it plays a central role in forecasting inflation - but rather that it should be
made clear that the authorities are not beholden to any specific value of the
currency. Moreover, the argument goes, a non-interventionist stance creates
positive incentives for the private sector to develop the capacity to price and
manage exchange rate risk.
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Evidence - from Kenya and elsewhere - suggests otherwise. As Edwards
(2007) and others have shown, intervention in support of the exchange rate
is the norm rather than the exception among IT as well as non-IT countries.
Theory also lends support to this view. Buffie et al. (2008), for example, sug
gest that, when fiscal policy reacts to variations in aid or commodity price
flows, some degree of exchange rate intervention may be desirable, particular
ly where dollarization is widespread. These arguments are particularly power
ful in environments where domestic prices are sticky or where other forms of
market imperfection (e.g. credit rationing) mean that the effects of exchange
rate volatility on real resource allocation are highly geared.
Responding at least indirectly to movements in the exchange rate is una
voidable in an IT setting in a small open economy such as Kenya's, even if
stabilizing the exchange rate is not a separate policy objective (see O'Connell,
2008). With imports accounting for around 30 per cent of total absorption,
there is inevitably a strong pass-through from the exchange rate to domes
tic prices and output (see, for example, Cheng, 2006). Any framework that
focuses on inflation and the output gap will therefore respond indirectly to
exchange rate movements, even when the authorities profess adherence to a
pure float.^^
But navigating these considerations requires coherence both at the level
of policy and in terms of communication. The key issue for the success of IT
is probably not that the authorities pursue a pure float but rather that they
establish a credible commitment that the inflation target will take precedence
when there is a conflict. In reality, the recent history of low global inflation
combined with the steady fall in velocity in many post-stabilization econo
mies allowed unsterilized exchange rate intervention aimed at limiting the ap
preciation of the domestic currency to be absorbed by rapid non-inflationary
growth in money demand, so that the two objectives were rarely in conflict.
With global inflation now rising more rapidly and the growth in real money
demand easing, the risk of conflict is rising, not least because letting the ex
change rate appreciate uncompetitively may be the easiest way of hitting an
inflation target in an import-dependent economy.
The favourable experience of emerging market inflation targeters over the
last decade, including over the recent global crisis period, suggests that these
concerns have been manageable. But as O'Connell (2008) notes, the literature
offers very little guidance on how multiple instruments, e.g. a policy interest
rate and foreign exchange intervention, ought to be deployed when imper
fect capital mobility allows the monetary authority some scope to reconcile
domestic with external objectives. Little is known, for example, regarding the
appropriate scale of intervention or the degree to which intervention should
be sterilized (Edwards, 2007). Anal3dical work on these issues is likely to begin
emerging as the group of inflation targeters gets wider; meanwhile, an appro
priate presumption is probably that the degree of capital mobility is increasing
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rather than decreasing, and that although some scope for active exchange rate
management probably exists, overemphasizing exchange rate objectives may
carry significant risks.
7.4.3 Weak transmission channels
The effectiveness of monetary policy and the credibility of any regime will
depend on how reliably and how quickly observable policy actions influence
inflation and other real variables; in other words, on the nature of the trans
mission mechanism. Critically, and especially in the context of an IT regime,
effectiveness also depends on how well the transmission mechanism is under
stood, as the ability of the monetary authorities to deploy their instruments
to anchor expected inflation requires demonstrable results. Credibility will be
undermined if observed policy actions are perceived to be ineffective or even
have persistently perverse outcomes.
The textbook macroeconomic model, which underpins both IT frameworks
and, with little modification, the more conventional monetary frameworks
employed in Africa, fundamentally derives from the research and experience
of the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD).^^
This model emphasizes the interest rate channels of transmission, in which
short-run interest rate decisions are transmitted directly to long-term interest
rates, which, in turn, influence the interest-sensitive components of aggregate
demand and hence moderate expected and actual inflation. In the open econ
omy setting, this effect is augmented by the exchange rate channel: higher
interest rates appreciate the exchange rate, which reduces net exports and
thus the output gap. In addition, exchange rate appreciation directly reduces
the domestic cost of imports.
For less mature emerging markets and for pre-emerging markets where the
financial sector is often much less developed, these traditional channels may
be less powerful, although others may dominate. Moreover, transmission ef
fects are also likely to be much less stable. We have already discussed how the
processes of structural transformation and innovation in financial markets
generate shocks to velocity and the money multiplier, which can substan
tially alter the short- to medium-run link between money growth or nominal
depreciation and domestic inflation and output. In the rest of this section,
we consider some other areas where the transmission mechanism in Kenya is
likely to differ from the textbook characterization. This is necessarily specula
tive as one of the major gaps in our knowledge about many contemporary
African economies is a robust quantitative assessment of the relative strengths
of alternative channels of monetary transmission.
In industrial countries, short-term market interest rates are the main in
strument of monetary policy, operating directly through interest-sensitive
components of absorption and indirectly through wealth effects, by altering
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collateral conditions and thereby expanding or contracting bank lending. An
implicit assumption is that the banking system is relatively competitive and
fully lent out so that changes in the short-run policy rate are rapidly trans
mitted through the length of the yield curve. In less developed economies,
including Kenya, where monetary policy still tends to be exercised through
operations on the central bank's own balance sheet - domestic credit policy,
bond operations, and foreign exchange sales - and where the banking sector
has been dominated by oligopolistic commercial banks, interest rates tend to
play a less important role. Although Kenya is home to one of the most devel
oped banking systems on the continent, levels of intermediation are still sig
nificantly lower than elsewhere in the world. Banks have, historically, tended
to be highly liquid, suggesting little intermediation at the margin, with excess
funds often invested not in private enterprises but in government securities,
foreign deposits, and non-remunerated excess reserves (Cihak and Podpiera,
2005; Sacerdoti, 2005; Saxegaard, 2006), suggesting that the bank credit chan
nel in the transmission of monetary policy has been weak. The absence of a
strong interest rate or credit channel effects is a feature of the few empirical
studies of the transmission mechanism in Africa. This feature emerges from
studies of Kenya (for example, the work by Cheng, 2006), although, impor
tantly, the most recent work focusing on bank performance over the 2000s
suggests that the bank lending channel is becoming significantly stronger (see
Sichei and Njenga, 2010).
The exposure of domestic banks to capital gains and losses from exchange
rate movements also strengthens the exchange rate channel. Although dollardenominated deposits are widely available, commercial banks rarely hold sub
stantial open positions, due to a combination of regulatory restrictions and
caution; nor do domestic firms, given the reluctance of banks to lend domesti
cally in foreign currency. Nonetheless, the widespread use of foreign currency
and foreign currency deposits in private portfolios increases the sensitivity of
domestic money demand to interest rates and inflation.
Finally, although conventional interest rate channels may not be strong,
interest rate effects may operate more powerfully through domestic debt mar
kets on to the fiscal accounts. Domestic asset markets in most African econo
mies, including Kenya, are still relatively thin and oligopolistic, while the CBK
still conducts much of its open market operations using government debt
instruments. The level and volatility of interest rates thus places considerable
stress on the consolidated fiscal accounts, so that monetary policy actions
can exert powerful real effects through the fiscal burden of interest payments.
These effects may be magnified when the domestic fiscal balance is also sensi
tive to movements in the exchange rate, as is the case in economies where
revenues are highly dependent on commodity prices and/or aid flows (see
O'Connell et al, 2007). These fiscal channels of transmission tend not to fea
ture in the textbook model, but understanding them is of critical importance
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for implementing effective monetary policy in most emerging and pre-emerging market economies.
We started this section by noting that policy effectiveness requires a cred
ible understanding of the monetary transmission mechanism. In reality, al
though our understanding is improving, we still lack a robust calibration of
the relative strength of the key channels from policy instruments to outcomes
and, arguably, less than is required to implement a full-blown and credible IT
regime. Addressing this gap in knowledge must be a priority for the central
bank.
7.4.4 Guarding against the re-emergence of fiscal dominance
A major achievement of the Kenyan authorities over the last decade has been
the elimination of fiscal dominance, allowing a coherent monetary policy to
emerge. The dragon of fiscal indiscipline is, of course, never completely slain,
so an important consideration becomes the capacity of alternative monetary
regimes to offer an effective bulwark against recurring fiscal indiscipline. Un
der conventional monetary targeting, and particularly that practised in many
Africa countries under the aegis of IMF-monitored programmes, this disciplin
ing role centred on quantitative ceilings on the domestic credit to government
component of reserve money growth and was policed by IMF programme
performance criteria.
As the IMF's role in Africa changes, with fewer countries engaged in pro
longed lending arrangements (Kenya's last IMF programme expired in 2007,
for example),2“ debate has turned to the question of how best to fill the ex
ternal agency of restraint role played by the IMF. Here, a well-established IT
regime may contribute in a positive manner. First, and most obviously, the
explicit commitment to an agreed inflation target - especially one that the au
thorities are seen to converge towards - combined with an increasingly trans
parent public role for the MFC in explaining policy choices helps to reinforce
the credibility and independence of the central bank. But this may be rein
forced by another mechanism, first described by Bean (1998) in the context of
the UK. Bean characterized the relationship between the central bank and the
ministry of finance as a so-called 'Stackleberg game', in which a credible mon
etary policy regime allowed the central bank to act as a 'Stackleberg follower',
which set monetary policy so as to deliver the inflation target, given the fiscal
policy stance being adopted by the Treasury (Ministry of Finance).Recognizing
this, the fiscal authorities, as the 'Stackleberg leader', would not be tempted
to overexpand the economy, as it would know that if it did the monetary au
thority would just raise interest rates and activity would not actually increase:
more precisely, the central bank's interest rate action would ensure that a fiscal
expansion directly crowded out private activity.
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This strong disciplining perspective may need to be tempered, however, if
the underlying political economy constraints generating excessive fiscal pres
sures have not been fully addressed. As countries such as Zambia and Uganda
discovered as they sought to implement 'cash budgets' in the 1990s, tight
commitments on inflation, and therefore on monetary finance in circum
stances where underlying spending pressures are not concomitantly reined
in can result in inefficient fiscal adjustments elsewhere or costly domestic or
international borrowing. In other words, monetary policy cannot on its own
'solve' structural problems of fiscal control: this requires deeper political con
siderations, even though a credible and transparent monetary regime may
play an important role in securing fiscal discipline on an ongoing basis. In
such circumstances, O'Connell (2008) suggests that, when fiscal problems are
serious:
...a more accommodative policy at the outset might share the adjustment
burden more efficiently between seigniorage and distortionary adjustments
in fiscal policy, such that greater flexibility on inflation outcomes early on
would more than repay itself in the medium run in terms of smoother ad
justment, lower inflation, and better performance of the real economy.

7.5 Conclusions
The achievement and maintenance of macroeconomic stability has been an
important feature of Kenya's economic performance since the mid-1990s. This
has helped lay the foundations for structural change and innovation in finan
cial markets and in the real economy, many of which are discussed elsewhere
in this volume. In this chapter, we have argued that, although the current
money targeting regime was both well suited to and effective in delivering
macroeconomic stability, it is less obvious that it still constitutes the most
effective regime as Kenya seeks to establish itself as an emerging market econ
omy in the twenty-first century. We have argued that the IT regimes that have
been adopted widely across industrialized and middle-income emerging mar
kets offer a potentially attractive alternative, but we have also identified some
of the pitfalls and challenges the Kenyan authorities are likely to encounter
as they move in this direction. For Kenya, the transition from one monetary
framework to another will be neither abrupt nor taken in isolation. Many of
the elements of full-fledged inflation targeting are already in place, and the
CBK is actively engaged in developing the capacity required to underpin new
operational procedures with credible technical analysis. Many of these devel
opments will be undertaken in concert with the other countries of the EAC.
The successful development of coherent monetary frameworks across the
member states holds out the prospect of better macroeconomic management
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at the country level, and of supporting broader economic convergence and
more effective macroeconomic policy co-ordination at the regional level.

Notes
1 Masson and Pattillo (2005) offer a similar diagnosis of the post-Independence mon
etary history of Africa.
2 This section draws extensively on papers presented hy two of the authors at a con
ference on monetary frameworks and inflation targeting hosted by the Central
Bank of Nigeria in Abuja, Nigeria, in January 2008. See O'Connell (2008) and Adam
(2008).
3 The notion of time inconsistency dates back to the Nobel prize-winning work of
Kydiand and Prescott (1977), subsequently developed in the context of monetary
policy by Barro and Gordon (1983). The essential idea is that when the authorities
set their policy instrument only after the private sector has formed its expectations
about inflation (possibly based on some prior announcement about the stance of
policy), they will have an incentive to renege on their announcement. Specifically,
a monetary authority concerned about output as well as inflation will have an in
centive to announce a commitment to low inflation and then renege on this com
mitment to exploit the short-run Phillips curve so as to boost aggregate demand.
Anticipating this incentive, the Initial policy announcement will no longer be cred
ible and private sector expectations will adjust accordingly. This creates an inflation
bias, locking the economy into a higher long-run inflation rate. In this situation, to
make their announcements credible and eliminate, or at least reduce, the inflation
bias, the monetary authorities may seek to commit to a fixed and verifiable policy
rule.
4 The nominal anchor is some quantity or price in the economy targeted by the mon
etary authorities. The anchor determines the path for average prices around which
all relative prices are determined and, in the long run, the growth rate of nominal
aggregates (nominal wages, nominal debt) will converge to the growth rate of the
anchor (plus any real growth in the underlying real variables).
5 To illustrate, consider the economy being subject to a positive external shock that
raises the ex ante return to domestic assets (this may be an exogenous fall in the
country risk premium or some technology shock that improves prospects in the do
mestic economy). With an open capital account, foreign private capital will flow in,
thereby generating an incipient appreciation of the currency. Attempts to stabilize
the exchange rate will draw the central bank into foreign exchange intervention,
thereby undermining the autonomy of domestic monetary policy through the ef
fect of intervention on the domestic money stock. Restoring monetary autonomy
through bond sterilization may work but only by driving up domestic Interest rates
relative to world rates, thereby exacerbating the original pressure on the exchange
rate. Eventually one of the objectives must be abandoned.
6 Choices over the path of NIR will have implications for the exchange rate, and the
two together influence the local currency value of this component of base money.
This creates a direct link between net foreign capital inflows, the authorities' re-
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sponse to these, and the pursuit of money targets. To the extent that the inflows
drive actual base money and broad money away from targets, this places additional
pressure on monetary policy instruments.
How 'forward-looking' this rule should be depends on the lags in the monetary
policy transmission process describing how quickly output and prices respond to
policy actions. This in turn reflects, among other things, the extent to which eco
nomic agents form their price expectations on a forward-looking basis as opposed
to relying on a backward-looking or 'rule of thumb' method. Matum et al. (2007)
derive results for Kenya suggesting that forward-looking expectations formation
weakly dominates 'rule of thumb' methods.
The Bank of England Governor's obligation to write an 'Open Letter' to the Chan
cellor (Minister of Finance) if inflation strays outside its target range is a good ex
ample of this approach.
Members of the Bank of England MFC have also stressed the importance for policy
credibility of developing a 'culture of intellectual dissent', in which the central
bank governor and his or her executive can find themselves in a minority on inter
est rate decisions.
Low-income or pre-emerging economies are not alone in this respect. As Edwards
(2007) and Blanchard et al. (2010) note, many industrialized countries act in a very
similar manner, declaring an inflation target but actively targeting the path for the
exchange rate. What matters, in the end, appears to be how these potentially con
flicting actions are reconciled.
See White (2009) for a flavour of this critique.
See Kenya National Bureau of Statistics: http://www.knbs.or.ke/sectoral/cpi/
cpil02009.html.
The simple rolling trend extrapolation represents a rule of thumb frequently used
in negotiations with IMF mission teams. At each quarter, the projected growth in
velocity is the extrapolation of a linear trend estimated using the last twelve quar
ters' data; likewise for the multiplier.
Adam et al. (2010) show, for the case of Tanzania, how structural reforms in that
economy since the mid-1990s contributed to a substantial increase in the demand
for money.
The money multiplier can be written as follows:
where C denotes
currency in circulation, R bank reserves, and D deposits, so that c is the cash-todeposit ratio and r the reserves-to-deposit ratio.
Since its promulgation in 1966, the CBK Act has been revised sixteen times. Eleven
of these revisions have occurred since 1996 and six since 2000. The 1996 revisions
established the nature and term of the Governor's appointment (by presidential
appointment and for a maximum of two terms of four years), prescribed that the
external value of the shilling would be market determined, and articulated clear
and specific objectives for monetary policy (see text).
The Treaty for the Establishment of the East African Community was signed on
30 November 1999 and entered into force on 7 July 2000 following its ratification
by the original three partner states: Kenya, Uganda, and Tanzania. The Republic of
Rwanda and the Republic of Burundi joined the EAC on 18 June 2007 and became
full members of the community with effect from 1 July 2007.
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18 The intuition is as follows. In a money targeting environment, policy is anchored
by a rule (i.e. a rate of growth for the money supply) that does not allow the instru
ment to respond to output and inflation developments (the ‘Friedman principle'
noted above). In an inflation targeting environment, however, the instrument does
respond. A supply-side shock, which puts upward pressure on inflation, will elicit a
contractionary policy reaction, and if this policy reaction feeds back on output (for
example through the IS curve), the original output volatility is amplified.
19 Or, in recent years, by policy decision on, for example, the US government subsidy
programme for biofuels.
20 The argument for excluding these items from the target derives from the view that
the role of monetary policy is to influence 'sticky' prices to bring the economy as
close as possible to its notional real business cycle path (i.e. the path that would
be followed if all prices were perfectly flexible). By this argument, prices that are
in fact fully flexible, as is the case of imports where variations in world prices are
allowed to pass through instantly to domestic prices, should be excluded from the
target. Failure to exclude them would lead to placing excess weight on the policy
levers. For example, seeking to lean against a positive oil price shock - which would
be the case if policy was geared to targeting headline inflation - would lead to an
inefficiently tight squeeze on the non-oil price component of the headline index,
serving to 'overdeflate' the economy.
21 For example, food shares account for around 10 per cent of CPI for the OECD (Euromonitor).
22 Some authors have argued that, if the exchange rate pass-through and capital mo
bility are sufficiently high, an inflation target may reduce to the virtual equivalent
of a pegged exchange rate regime: shocks that otherwise depreciate the exchange
rate and put upward pressure on inflation will draw forth an increase in the inter
est rate, which, in turn, will appreciate the exchange rate. Caballero and Krishnamurthy (2005) note that, if market participants anticipate this reaction ex ante, they
will treat their domestic currency claims as effectively insured against depreciation,
and will take open positions that expose the economy to a greater likelihood of
capital account crises.
23 Labelled the 'new Keynesian open economy model', this model consists of four
basic elements: (i) an open economy IS curve characterizing aggregate demand in
which the output gap responds to movements in real interest rates and the real ex
change rate; (ii) on the supply side, a Phillips curve in which the conventional infla
tion-output relationship is augmented by a pass-through effect from the exchange
rate; (lii) an interest parity condition; and (iv) a policy rule summarizing central
bank interest rate-setting behaviour (Berg et al, 2006). As Adam et al (2009) note,
this model can be readily adapted to reflect an environment in which the policy
instrument is the money supply rather than the interest rate.
24 This is not counting the Rapid Access Exogenous Shocks Eacility credit extended in
2009 at the onset of the global financial crisis.
25 The Stackleberg game is a concept in economics and game theory used to character
ize the strategic interaction between parties, typically firms competing in a market,
in circumstances in which each understands the other's reaction function (i.e. how
they will react to any action taken by the other piayer) and where one player, the
'Stackleberg leader', has some sort of market power, first-mover, or other informa-
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tional advantage. A key insight is that the Stackleberg leader's best outcome will be
that which internalizes the follower’s reaction function.
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